



In order to increase competition in U.S. House races, states
should look to extra-legislative bodies to redraw congressional
boundaries.
Politicians and pundits alike regularly bemoan the lack of electoral competition in congressional
races as incumbent reelection rates frequently soar to over 90 percent. Redistricting and
gerrymandering are often blamed as a way to lock members into their seats for at least a
decade.  Jamie L. Carson, Michael H. Crespin and Ryan D. Williamson ask if there are ways
to inject more competition into elections during the mandated redistricting cycles.  Based on an
analysis of redistricting cycles from 1972 to 2012, they show that commission and court-drawn
districts experience marginally more competition than those drawn by state legislatures.  These
results provide additional support for the argument that one way to increase the competitiveness
of congressional elections is to allow extra-legislative bodies to draw congressional district
boundaries.
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars noticed that members of Congress were winning reelection at
higher and higher rates. While some blame redistricting as a contributing factor to the increase in
the incumbency advantage, others disagree over how much it mattered and argue partisan
sorting is really to blame. Proponents of redistricting reform argue taking the power to draw
district boundaries away from powerful elected officials will increase competition and improve
democracy. Starting with the first prototype commission in 1972, we test if the elections in
congressional districts drawn outside of the legislative process are any more competitive
compared to the regular method. Using data from the last five redistricting cycles, we show
commission and court drawn plans exhibit moderately increased levels of competition. 
Unable to come up with a redistricting plan for the 1966 congressional elections, the Maryland
General Assembly left it to the courts to draw new district boundaries. After the frustration with the previous course
of action, the state government decided to experiment with a relatively new method and appointed a joint
committee consisting of delegates, state senators, and administrative representatives, to devise new
congressional districts following the 1970 census. Although the legislature maintained the authority to approve the
final maps, the goal was for the committee to do the vast majority of the work. This represented an attempt to take
the initial planning outside of the normal legislative process and formed the basis for a prototype redistricting
commission.
In the following decades, additional states such as Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, and Montana also tried to move
redistricting, partially or in whole, toward an extra-legislative process. Currently, 8 states use some sort of
commission, broadly defined, to help draw congressional districts. In other states, courts step in to produce plans
when legislatures are unable to come up with maps on time or that pass legal standing. Since these methods are
an attempt to take politics and legislatures out of the process, we expect elections drawn by courts or
commissions to be more competitive. 
Figure 1 charts the proportion of competitive races against the three different methods for drawing congressional
districts.  A competitive race is classified as such if the winning candidate received less than 60 percent of the two-
party vote in that election. From this, we see that legislative-drawn districts have a lower proportion of competitive
races than both court-drawn and commission-drawn districts, which generally conforms to our expectations that
states can, in fact, inject more competition in U.S. House races. 
Figure 1 – Proportion of Competitive Races by District Type
Figure 2 charts the proportion of competitive races against the proportion of districts not drawn by the state
legislature over time.  Here, we see that these two generally move together.  From 1972 until 1992, the proportion
of non-legislative drawn districts increased steadily.  There was a large drop-off in 2002, but this was followed by
another increase in the most recent cycle.  Interestingly, the proportion of competitive House races follows this
same trend.  This appears to indicate that there is some relationship between how congressional districts are
drawn and the level of competition in races during that election cycle.
Figure 2 – Competitive Races versus Non-legislative Drawn Districts over Time
With these encouraging results, we then turn to a more sophisticated analysis.  To do so, our statistical model
estimates whether or not a race is competitive at the 60 percent threshold. Our main explanatory variable is the
method employed to redraw the congressional boundaries.  We also statistically control for the presence of a
quality challenger, open seat races, elections in southern states, the amount of money spent by both campaigns,
a measure of the district’s partisanship (as measured by presidential vote shares in each congressional district),
and the year these elections are held. Our results in Figure 3 show that, all else equal, when an extra-legislative
body is responsible for reshaping districts, the subsequent elections have a 4 percent greater chance of being
competitive.
Figure 3 – Predicted Probability of Competitiveness, 1972-2012
These first results, however, combine all the redistricting cycles, including years earlier years when elections were
generally more competitive.  In Figure 4 we separate our analyses into two groups, 1972-82 and 1992-2012, and
show the effects are more pronounced, largely due to the widespread use of computing technology.  In the earlier
time frame, there is no difference between types of plans.  In later years, though most races are not competitive,
non-legislative plans are nearly twice as likely to be competitive compared to their legislative based counterparts.
Figure 4 – Effect of Technology on Competitiveness
In summary, if states wish to increase
competition in their congressional
districts, utilizing non-legislative
methods when redistricting is an option
that should be considered. Knowing
that state legislators are able to control
the level of competition in a district,
should the power to redraw
congressional lines be removed from
their hands? If so, would it make sense
to utilize independent or non-partisan
commissions to reduce the amount of
influence exerted by partisan state
legislators? If states are able to alter
the balance of power in the House
through their redistricting plans, then
how they draw the seats can have far
reaching policy consequences well into
the future.
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